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Abstract: Until October 2004 corporate insiders in Germany were required to report trades in the 
shares of their firm "without delay". In practice substantial reporting delays were common. We 
show that the delays are systematically related to the characteristics of the firm. Delays are longer 
in widely-held firms and in firms using German accounting standards. This suggests that managers 
of these firms are less responsive to the informational requirements of the capital market. We fur-
ther find that abnormal returns after the reporting date of an insider trade are independent of the 
reporting delay. This implies that prices are distorted in the period between the trading and the re-
porting date. This is a strong point in favor of regulation requiring and enforcing immediate disclo-
sure of insider trades.  
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1. Introduction 
Corporate insiders arguably know more about the prospects of their firm than the capital mar-
ket. Consequently, most countries have adopted regulation that requires corporate insiders to 
report their trades and, in some cases, prohibits trading.
1 Several empirical studies have 
documented that stock prices react to the announcement of insider trades, thereby substantiat-
ing the claim that corporate insiders possess superior information.
2
Regulation in different countries differs with respect to the time allowed for the reporting of 
trades. In the US, insider trades had to be reported no later than the 10th day of the month 
following the trade. The Sarbanes-Oxley act now requires reporting within two days after the 
trade. Corporate insiders in the UK are required to report their transactions no more than five 
business days after the trading day.
3 Several other countries (e.g., Australia, Austria, Sweden) 
have also adopted a five day reporting requirement. In Germany, trades had to be reported 
"without delay" until October 2004 and within five business days since then. Canada allows 
for a 10 day delay and Malaysia for a 14 day delay. In Switzerland, trades have to be reported 
until the fourth business day of the month after the month in which the trade occurred as long 
as the total trading volume in the calendar month does not exceed 100,000 Swiss Francs. 
Once that threshold is reached each additional trade has to be reported within two business 
days.  
These international differences and the recent changes in regulation in some countries lead to 
the question of whether the time allowed for reporting insider trades matters. There are sev-
 
1  Zhang (2001) develops a model in which it is optimal that corporate insiders are allowed to trade in shares of 
their firm but are required to report these trades.  
2   Examples include the studies by Jaffe (1974) and Lakonishok and Lee (2001) for the US, Bajo and Petracci 
(2004) for Italy, Fidrmuc et al. (2006) for the UK and Betzer and Theissen (2007) for Germany. Datta and 
Iskandar-Datta (1996) find that prices of corporate bonds also react to the announcement of stock trades by 
corporate insiders.  
3   In addition, corporate insiders in the UK are not allowed to trade in the two months preceding final or in-
terim earnings announcements and in the month prior to quarterly earnings announcements.   2
eral reasons why it might matter. As already mentioned, several empirical papers have con-
cluded that share prices react to the reporting of insider trades. This implies that the market is 
unable to infer the full information content of the trade on the trading day. Consequently, 
prices are distorted in the period between the trading and the reporting day, thereby impairing 
the informational efficiency of the market. Further, a corporate insider possessing superior 
information may intend to execute more than one trade. If delayed reporting is feasible the 
insider may delay the reporting of the earlier trades until she has completed all transactions. 
Such a practice will obviously be to the disadvantage of the counterparties to the trades.  
The present paper is the first to analyze the determinants and implications of reporting delays. 
We provide empirical evidence from Germany. Here, until October 2004, trades had to be 
reported "without delay". This prescription is imprecise and subject to interpretation. We 
show that substantial reporting delays exist. We continue by analyzing whether there are any 
regularities with respect to the reporting delays. We find that delays are smaller for insider 
sales than for purchases, and that delays have generally decreased over time. Insiders in 
widely held firms report their trades with longer delays than do insiders in firms with a con-
trolling shareholder. As managers in widely held firms are likely to be subject to lower levels 
of control by the owners of the firm they may be less responsive to the information require-
ments of the owners and the capital market in general.  
We further find that insiders in firms adopting international accounting standards report their 
trades faster than insiders in firms using German accounting standards. In our interpretation, 
this result implies that corporate officers in firms adopting international accounting standards 
are more open towards the capital market and its desire for transparency. In a certain sense, 
then, these firms appear to have developed a culture that is more responsive to the needs of 
investors in financial markets.    3
                                                
In order to address the issue of market efficiency we relate the reporting delays to the cumula-
tive abnormal returns (CARs) after the announcement day. We find that the CARs are inde-
pendent of the reporting delays. This implies that, even with more time between the trading 
and the reporting date, the market does not learn the information conveyed by the announce-
ment of the trade. Consequently, prices are distorted when the reporting of insider trades is 
delayed. This result is a strong point in favor of regulation requiring and enforcing immediate 
disclosure of insider trades.
4 Our empirical findings thus lend support to the theoretical pre-
diction in Huddart et al. (2001). They use an extension of Kyle's (1985) sequential auction 
equilibrium to show that information is reflected more rapidly in prices when insiders have to 
disclose their trades.
5  
Our paper is related to previous research on insider trading, most notably to research investi-
gating into the price reactions to insider trades. We are not aware, however, of any previous 
research focusing on reporting delays.
6 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In 
section  2 we describe the legal framework in Germany as well as our data set. In section  3 we 
analyze the determinants of the reporting delays. Section  4 is devoted to the relation between 
reporting delays and informational efficiency. Section  5 offers a summary and derives the 
implications of our results.  
 
4  The argument in favor of regulation requiring immediate disclosure follows from the beneficial effects of 
accurate and timely disclosure (see e.g. section 2.1 in the survey by  Leuz and Wysocki 2008). These bene-
fits are likely to outweigh the costs of disclosure to the firm which are arguably low in the case considered 
here.  
5  Hu and Noe (2001) argue that managerial insider trading may be a substitute for explicit managerial compen-
sation. In this case there may be benefits (e.g., a better alignment of the interests of owners and managers) 
that outweigh the cost associated with distorted prices.  
6   Seyhun (1986, p. 207) reports delays but neither seeks to analyze their determinants, nor investigates into the 
impact of delayed reporting on market efficiency. Etebari et al. (2003), relying on data from New Zealand, 
compare insider trades by large shareholders (which had to be disclosed immediately) to those of directors 
(which were disclosed in the firm's annual report) and find that the latter are more profitable. They do not at-
tempt to control for the different characteristics of the trades in the two subsamples, and they use the trading 
day (rather than the disclosure date) as their event date.   4
                                                
2.  Legal Background and Data  
Germany was very slow in adopting regulation on trading by corporate insiders. An amend-
ment to the Securities Trading Act (Wertpapierhandelsgesetz) that required them to report 
their trades became effective as late as July 1, 2002.
7 Members of the executive board, mem-
bers of the supervisory board
8 and their family members have to report trades in shares and 
other equity-related securities of their company. Board members of firms with exchange-
listed subsidiaries also have to report trades in shares of the subsidiary. Former board mem-
bers and large shareholders are not required to report their trades.  
Trades have to be reported both to the company and to the Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienst-
leistungsaufsicht (BaFin)
9, the German analogue to the SEC. During our sample period, 
trades had to be reported "without delay" when the total transaction volume within a 30 day 
window exceeds € 25,000.
10 In our empirical analysis we only include trades for which this 
immediate reporting requirement applies. We thus include i) all trades larger than € 25,000 
and ii) trades smaller than or equal to € 25,000 only if the aggregated volume of trades by the 
same insider in the preceding 30 days surpasses € 25,000. As an example, consider an insider 
buying shares worth € 20,000 on April 15 and shares worth € 10,000 on May 10. Initially 
(i.e., on April 15) the first trade does not have to be reported. However, upon execution of the 
second trade both trades have to be reported. We only include the second trade in our analysis 
because only this trade has to be reported without delay.  
 
7   Prior to that date corporate insiders were only subject to the Securities Trading Act's general prohibition of 
trading on private information. 
8   German listed firms are typically incorporated as "Aktiengesellschaft" and have a two-tier board. The mem-
bers of the executive board manage the day-to-day operations of the firm, the members of the supervisory 
board appoint and monitor the members of the executive board. More detailed descriptions of corporate gov-
ernance in Germany can be found in Goergen and Renneboog (2003) and Rieckers and Spindler (2004).  
9   The Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin) is the federal authority charged with the surveil-
lance of securities trading. It was created in 2002 when three formerly independent institutions [the Bunde-
saufsichtsamt für das Kreditwesen (banking surveillance), the Bundesaufsichtsamt für das Versicherungswe-
sen (surveillance of the insurance industry) and the Bundesaufsichtsamt für den Wertpapierhandel (surveil-
lance of securities trading)] were merged. 
10  In October 2004 new rules became effective. Trades now have to be reported within five business days 
whenever the total volume in a calendar year exceeds € 5,000.   5
                                                
The report has to contain the trading date, information on the position of the trader within the 
company, the security traded, the trade size, and the price. The company has to publish the 
trade information. This usually happens by way of posting the information on the company's 
web site.  
Certain exemptions from the reporting requirement exist. Securities obtained as a part of the 
remuneration (e.g. stock options) do not have to be reported. When stock options are exer-
cised, however, the purchase of the shares has to be reported. Further, the rules do not apply 
to firms that are only traded over the counter.
11  
Sanctions for late filing were modest during our sample period. Corporate insiders filing late 
faced a fine of up to € 50,000. In the years 2002-2004 the BaFin examined a total of 230 cas-
es. In nine cases corporate insiders were convicted of violating the reporting requirements and 
had to pay fines of up to € 20,000. Given these modest sanctions it comes as no surprise that 
late filings were quite common.
12 The objectives of our paper are to a) analyze who files late, 
and b) to investigate into the consequences that late filings have for the informativeness of 
prices.  
The BaFin maintains a database of all insider trades that have been reported. It contains in-
formation about the company name and ISIN code, the trading date and the reporting date, the 
security traded, the transaction type (purchase or sale), the transaction volume and the price, 
and the name and the function of the person reporting the trade (executive board member, 
supervisory board member or other person subject to the trade reporting requirement). Our 
empirical analysis is based on this database. It covers the period from July 1
st 2002 to June 
30
th 2004. A total of 4,272 transactions by insiders in firms listed on a German exchange have 
been reported in this period.  
 
11  There is an OTC segment on German exchanges termed "Freiverkehr". Listing requirements are generally 
low in this segment.   6
                                                                                                                                                        
We complement the data on insider transactions with supplementary data obtained from vari-
ous sources. By matching the names given in the BaFin database with information on the 
composition of the executive and supervisory boards provided in Hoppenstedt Aktienführer,
13 
we identify transactions initiated by the chairman of either the executive or the supervisory 
board. We further collect data on the ownership structure of the firm from Hoppenstedt Ak-
tienführer. It lists all investors with a stake of at least 5% of the shares outstanding. Data on 
(dividend-adjusted) daily closing prices is obtained from Datastream. We collect information 
on the publication dates of annual reports, intermediate reports and quarterly earnings an-
nouncements from Bloomberg, Datastream, and corporate web sites. Finally, we obtain in-
formation on the accounting standards by checking the annual report of the fiscal year preced-
ing the insider trade.  
In 163 cases the entries in the BaFin database are incomplete, e.g. because a trade is not char-
acterized as being a purchase or a sale. We drop the corresponding observations from the 
sample. The data set contains 15 trades among insiders, i.e., transactions in which one insider 
is the buyer and another insider is the seller. The most likely reason for these transactions is 
the transfer of stocks between spouses, or between executives and their children, possibly for 
tax reasons. We drop the corresponding observations because these transactions arguably do 
not constitute a signal to the market. In 42 cases the same person reports more than one equal-
sized trade in the same security and at the same price on the same day. We interpret these 
observations as duplicates and drop all but one from the sample. In cases in which the re-
ported trading or reporting date falls on a weekend or a holiday we replace the date with the 
date of the first subsequent business day. In 15 cases the reporting date as it appears in the 
BAFin database is prior to the trading day. We correct the dates after cross-checking the data 
 
12   Late filing also occurs in other countries. In a recent paper, Betzer et al. (2007) show that in a (pre-Sarbanes-
Oxley) US sample containing more than 360,000 trades more than 18% of the trades were reported late.  
13   The Hoppenstedt Aktienführer is a yearly publication providing detailed information (e.g., ownership struc-
ture, board composition, balance sheet information) on German listed firms.   7
with other sources. Finally we discard 178 observations because the available stock price data 
is insufficient to conduct an event study with an event window of 41 days and an estimation 
window of 180 days. 
We aggregate all trades in the shares of a given firm that were executed by the same corporate 
insider on the same day. The aggregated transactions are treated as one trade. The (net) trans-
action volume is taken to be the sum of the volumes of the individual trades. If the net trans-
action volume is positive [negative], we classify the aggregated transaction as a purchase 
[sale]. The details of the sample selection procedure are documented in Table 1.  
<Table 1.> 
The final dataset consists of 1,977 observations (972 purchases and 1,005 sales). Table 2. 
presents descriptive statistics. The average trade size is close to € 1 million (corresponding to 
slightly more than 1% of the value of shares outstanding), with sales on average being larger 
than purchases. The trade size distribution is heavily skewed. The median trade size is about 
€ 70,000 (0.06% of the value of shares outstanding) and is, again, larger for sales than for 
purchases. Members of the executive board and the CEO in particular account for the largest 
number of trades. The average trade size, on the other hand, is larger for trades initiated by 
members and, in particular, the chairman of the supervisory board.  
<Table 2.> 
In the introduction we noted that insiders may execute a series of trades and delay the report-
ing of the earlier trades until they have completed all transactions. Panel C of Table 2 pro-
vides evidence that this behavior is not uncommon. We sort all sample trades into two catego-
ries, namely single trades and trades which are part of a series. A trade is classified as a single 
trade if it is not followed by another trade by the same insider before it is reported. A trade is 
part of a series if it is either followed by another trade by the same insider before it is re-
ported, or if it is preceded by another trade by the same insider that has not yet been reported.   8
The results reported in Table 2 indicate that 38.3% of all trades (370 out of 972 purchases and 
387 out of 1,005 sales) are part of a series of trades. We do not know whether these serial 
trades were executed in the intention to strategically exploit superior information. However, 
they certainly have the potential to impose losses on the counterparties to the trades as com-
pared to a situation in which each insider trade is reported immediately.  
3.  What Determines the Delays - Empirical Results  
As noted in the previous section trades had to be reported "without delay" during our sample 
period. The law was not specific as to what exactly that meant. In practice, substantial report-
ing delays occurred, as is documented in Table 3. About 25% of the insider trades are re-
ported on the trading day or the subsequent day. Another 48.3% of the trades are reported 
between 2 and 7 days after the trade, 12.9% are reported in the second week after the trade, 
6.9% are reported in the third or fourth week after the trade and the remaining 6.2% of the 
trades have reporting delays of more than 30 days. The mean reporting delay is 13.1 days, the 
median delay is 4 days. The separate figures for insider purchases and sales also shown in 
Table 3 reveal that purchases are reported with longer delays than sales. The difference is 
statistically significant.  
Some trades are reported with extreme delays (the maximum reporting delay in our sample is 
442 days). These extreme observations are likely to be outliers and may bias our results. In 
order to assure the robustness of our results we repeat our complete analysis after exclusion of 
observations with delays exceeding 30 days.  
<Table 3.> 
The figures in Table 3 reveal that substantial reporting delays exist, and that there is consider-
able variation in the reporting delays. Whether this variation is systematic is one of the ques-  9
                                                
tions we now turn to. To this end we sort the sample into groups according to the following 
variables:  
•  Trade size, measured in Euro (below / above mean
14),  
•  firm size, measured by the market value of equity (below / above median),  
•  trading date (first versus second half of sample period),  
•  the ownership structure, measured by a variable indicating whether the firm has an indi-
vidual shareholder owning more than 25% of the voting equity (closely-held firms) or 
not (widely held firms),  
•  the accounting standards (either German or IFRS / IAS / US GAAP),  
•  the position of the insider within the firm.  
For each partition of the sample we report average delays for all trades and separate values for 
purchases and sales. We repeat the analysis after exclusion of observations with a delay in 
excess of 30 days.  
The results are presented in Table 4. Smaller trades and trades by insiders in smaller firms 
tend to be reported with longer delays. "Early" trades (those trades that occurred in the first 
half of our sample period, i.e., between July 1, 2002 and June 30, 2003) are also reported with 
longer delays. This indicates that the reporting delays have generally decreased over time.  
We do find evidence that trades in widely held firms are reported with longer delays. Manag-
ers in widely held firms are likely to be subject to lower levels of control by the owners of the 
firm. This, in turn, may make them less responsive to the information requirements of the 
owners and the capital market in general. A related argument may explain why trades (and 
purchases in particular) by insiders in firms using German accounting standards are reported 
 
14  We split the sample at the mean rather than at the median because the trade size variable is heavily skewed. 
Splitting the sample at the median instead yields qualitatively similar results.    10
with longer delays. German accounting standards are not tuned to the information require-
ments of the capital market
15 and firms using German accounting standards may therefore be 
less willing to provide investors in financial markets with timely and accurate information.  
The position of the insider within the firm appears to matter. When comparing the reporting 
delays of five groups of insiders (the CEO, other members of the executive board, the chair of 
the supervisory board, other members of the supervisory board, and other traders) the 
ANOVA F-statistic for the null hypothesis of no differences in means indicates rejection of 
the null in three cases.  
<Table 4.> 
The univariate analysis presented thus far does not take into account the interdependences 
between the explanatory variables. We therefore now turn to a regression analysis. The de-
pendent variable is the reporting delay. As noted earlier, there are outliers in the sample that 
may bias the results. We therefore estimate five versions of the model:  
•  a simple linear model,  
•  a linear model where observations with delays in excess of 30 days are excluded,  
•  a winsorized model in which delays in excess of 30 days are set to 30 days,  
•  a log model in which the dependent variable is the log of 1 plus the delay
16,  
•  a probit model in which the dependent variable is a binary variable taking on the value 
one if the delay is more than 7 days and zero otherwise. The cutoff value of 7 calendar 
days corresponds to 5 business days. This, in turn, is the maximum delay allowed ac-
cording to the new regulation that became effective in October 2004.  
                                                 
15  See e.g. Leuz and Wüstemann (2004, p. 475), who conclude that "[t]he evidence ... suggests that the level of 
public disclosure is lower in Germany and that financial statements in Germany are generally less informa-
tive than those of UK or US firms".  
16  We add 1 to the delays because there are many observations with a zero delay. The log model puts less 
weight on extreme observations.   11
The univariate analysis has shown that the reporting delays for purchases and sales differ. We 
therefore include a dummy variable identifying insider sales on the right-hand side. The re-
sults in Table 4 further suggest that reporting delays have decreased over time We account for 
this decrease by including a dummy variable which identifies trades executed in the second 
half of the sample period.  
We further include the size of the insider trade (measured by the relative volume, the transac-
tion volume expressed as a percentage of the number of shares outstanding) and firm size 
(measured by the log of the market value of equity) as independent variables. Finally, we in-
clude dummy variables for widely-held firms, for firms using international accounting stan-
dards (IFRS/IAS or US GAAP) and dummy variables for trades by the chair and members of 
both the executive and the supervisory board among the set of explanatory variables.
17  
<Table 5.> 
The results are shown in Table 5. Our earlier finding that insider sales are reported with short-
er delays is confirmed. The coefficient on the dummy variable identifying insider sales is 
significantly negative in four out of the five models. We also confirm the previous finding 
that reporting delays have decreased over time.  
Reporting delays are not systematically related to trade size. There is some evidence that 
trades by insiders in larger firms are reported with shorter delays. The respective coefficient is 
significantly negative in two cases.  
                                                 
17  Insiders wishing to execute more than one trade may deliberately delay the reporting of the first trade in 
order to increase the profitability of their trades. We would, therefore, expect to find longer reporting delays 
when a trade is followed by other trades prior to being reported. We construct a multiple-trade dummy vari-
able that identifies these cases. Including this variable yields a significantly positive coefficient while not 
materially affecting the results presented in the text. We do not report the results including the multiple-trade 
dummy for two reasons. First, a trade that is followed by another trade before it is reported can, by defini-
tion, not have a zero reporting delay. Therefore, we are likely to find a positive coefficient on the multiple 
trade dummy. Second, assume reporting delays are random and, in particular, are independent from subse-
quent trades by the same insider. Now consider a trade that is, by chance, reported with a long delay. This 
trade has a larger probability of being followed by a second trade by the same insider before it is reported. In 
the regression we may therefore find a positive relation between the multiple-trade dummy and the reporting 
delays. This relation, however, would be spurious.   12
Trades by insiders in firms that adopt international accounting standards are reported with 
shorter delays. The coefficient is negative and significant at the 1% level in all five models. 
Also consistent with our previous findings, trades by insiders in widely-held firms are re-
ported with longer delays. All five coefficients are positive and four are significant at the 1% 
level.  
With respect to the identity of the trader there is weak evidence that trades by the chair and  
members of the executive board and the chair of the supervisory board are reported with 
shorter delays whereas those of other members of the supervisory board are reported with 
longer delays.  
In summary, the regression results are fully consistent with the univariate results presented 
earlier. Most importantly, the finding that both the ownership structure of the firm and the 
accounting standards matter is confirmed. The results thus support our conclusion that 
widely-held firms and firms applying German accounting standards are less responsive to the 
informational requirements of investors, analysts and other market participants.    13
4.  Reporting Delays and Informational Efficiency 
Several empirical papers have concluded that share prices react to both the occurrence of an 
insider trade itself and to the reporting of the trade.
18 This implies that the market is unable to 
infer the full information content of the trade on the trading day. Consequently, prices are 
distorted in the period between the trading and the reporting date. Longer reporting delays 
will thus impair market efficiency. It may, however, be the case that the market learns some 
of the information even without reporting of the insider trade. If this is the case, reporting day 
abnormal returns will be smaller for insider trades that are reported with longer delays.  
To address this issue empirically we first conduct a standard event study. We use the CDAX 
performance index, a value-weighted, broad-based index calculated by Deutsche Börse AG, 
to estimate market model expected returns over a 180 day estimation window ending 20 days 
prior to the day on which the insider trade was reported.
19 We define the reporting date of the 
insider trade as the event day and then calculate cumulative abnormal returns over a 20 day 
event windows starting on the event day. The results are presented in the first two columns of 
Table 6. Consistent with the results of previous papers we find that the reporting of insider 
trades is associated with significant cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). Share prices rise 
after the reporting of insider purchases (the CAR0,20 amounts to 2.40%) and they decline after 
insider sales (the CAR amounts to -2.63%).  
<Table 6.> 
In a second step we test whether the magnitude of the CARs depends on the reporting delays. 
In order to do so we sort the observations into two groups - those with a reporting delay of 
                                                 
18  See Chang and Suk (1998), Lakonishok and Lee (2001), Fidrmuc et al. (2006) and Betzer and Theissen 
(2007). 
19  When the reporting delay exceeds 20 days, the estimation window includes the trading date. This may lead to 
biased estimation of the market model parameters. We addressed this potential problem in two ways. First, 
we re-estimated our model (and the subsequent cross-sectional analysis) after excluding all observations with 
a delay in excess of 20 days. Second, we replaced the market-model adjustment by simple index-adjustment 
in our event study. Results were similar to those reported in the text and are thus omitted from the paper.    14
seven days or less, and those with a delay of eight or more days. We do not find significant 
differences between the groups. The reporting day CAR0,20 of purchases with short reporting 
delays is 1.90%. The corresponding value for insider purchases reported with long delays is 
larger, amounting to 3.59%. The t-statistic of 1.60 indicates that the difference just falls short 
of being significant at the 10% level. The difference between the CARs for insider sales with 
short and long reporting delays is much smaller. The cumulative abnormal returns amount to 
-2.67% and -2.50%, respectively, and the difference is far from being significant.  
These results indicate that the magnitude of the abnormal return after the announcement day 
does not decrease when the trade is reported with a longer delay. It thus appears that the mar-
ket does not learn the information conveyed by the announcement of the insider trade. Conse-
quently, reporting delays have a negative impact on the information content of prices.  
The univariate analysis conducted thus far does not take into account that the reporting day 
CARs may depend on variables we have not considered. Previous research (e.g. Fidrmuc et al. 
2006, Betzer and Theissen 2007) has uncovered that the CARs are related to the characteris-
tics of the insider trade, the characteristics of the firm, and the position of the insider within 
the firm. We therefore now turn to a multivariate regression analysis in which we control for 
these variables.  
The dependent variable is the CAR0,20
20. The CAR for sales is multiplied by -1. This allows 
us to pool the data for purchases and sales. In order to allow for different CARs for purchases 
and sales we include a dummy variable identifying insider sales on the right-hand side. We 
also include a measure of the size of the insider trade (the trade size as a percentage of the 
number of shares outstanding), a measure of firm size (the log of the market value of equity), 
a measure of the firm's profitability (the return on equity), a measure of leverage (the ratio of 
debt to total assets) and dummy variables identifying widely-held firms and firms adopting   15
                                                                                                                                                        
international accounting standards. The informational hierarchy hypothesis posits that trades 
by insiders who are more involved with the day-to-day operations of the firm (and who there-
fore have better access to information) have larger price impacts. We therefore also include 
dummy variables identifying the position of the insider within the firm. Finally, Betzer and 
Theissen (2007) have shown that insider trades prior to earnings announcements have larger 
price impacts.
21 We take this into account by including a dummy variable (denoted "pre-
announcement period") that identifies insider trades executed in the 60 days prior to an annual 
or interim earnings announcement or in the 30 days prior to a quarterly earnings announce-
ment.   
22
The variable of prime impact is the reporting delay. We estimate five versions of the model. 
Model 1 is the base model. In model 2 we exclude all observations with delays larger than 30 
days. Model 3 uses a winsorized variable, i.e., delays in excess of 30 days are set to 30. 
Model 4 measures the delay by the log of 1 plus the delay, and model 5 includes a dummy 
variable taking on the value 1 if the delay is larger than 7 days. The results of all five models 
are reported in Table 7.  
Reporting day abnormal returns appear to be equal for insider purchases and sales. They are, 
if anything, negatively related to the size of the insider trade and to the size of the firm. CARs 
are significantly negatively related to firm profitability and to our measure of leverage. Trades 
by insiders in widely-held firms and by insiders in firms using international accounting stan-
dards are associated with higher CARs.
23 Trades by the CEO, by ordinary members of the 
 
20   To check the robustness of our results we re-estimated all models using the CAR0,10 and the CAR0,1 instead. 
The results are qualitatively similar but R
2s are considerably lower and some variables lose significance. 
21  See also Hillier and Marshall (2002) on this issue.  
22   We obtained the data on earnings announcement dates from Bloomberg, Datastream, and company web sites. 
The choice of the 60 and 30 day windows is motivated by the fact that trades within two months prior to an-
nual or interim earnings announcements and trades within one month prior to a quarterly earnings an-
nouncement are prohibited under UK regulation.  
23  The result that trades reported by insiders in firms using international accounting standards have higher 
CARs is inconsistent with the notion that international accounting standards are more informative. If they 
were more informative, we should expect informational asymmetries between insiders and the capital market   16
executive board and by the chair of the supervisory board tend to have higher CARs than 
those by members of the base group (family members and other persons required to report 
their trades). Trades by the CEO appear to have a smaller price impact than trades by other 
members of the executive board. This result is inconsistent with the informational hierarchy 
hypothesis. Insider trades executed prior to earnings announcements have higher CARs. 
These results are consistent with those found in the literature, most notably those in Betzer 
and Theissen (2007).  
<Table 7.> 
The coefficient on the delay variable is insignificant in all models and is positive in four out 
of five models. The results thus support our earlier finding that the cumulative abnormal re-
turns after the reporting date do not decrease when a trade is reported with a longer delay. 
Consequently, market prices are distorted in the period between execution and reporting of 
the trade. This result is a strong point in favor of a regulation requiring and enforcing imme-
diate disclosure of insider trades.  
5.  Summary and Conclusion 
Until October 2004 corporate insiders in Germany were required to report trades in the shares 
of their firm "without delay". In practice substantial delays were common. In the present pa-
per we analyze both the determinants and the consequences of these reporting delays.  
We find trading patterns that are consistent with the strategic use of private information. Cor-
porate insiders frequently execute a series of trades before any of the trades of the series is 
reported. In our sample 38.3% of all trades are part of a series. This trading pattern is obvi-
ously to the disadvantage of the counterparties to the trades - with immediate reporting of 
                                                                                                                                                          
to be lower in firms adopting international accounting standards. In this case, however, we would expect 
smaller CARs for these firms.   17
each insider trade the second and later trades of a series would have occurred at more favor-
able prices.  
When analyzing the determinants of the reporting delays we find that the delays are system-
atically related to the characteristics of the firm. In particular, delays are longer in widely-held 
firms and in firms using German accounting standards. These results suggest that managers of 
these firms are less responsive to the informational requirements of the capital market.  
Abnormal returns after the reporting date of an insider trade are independent of the reporting 
delay. This implies that prices are distorted in the period between the trading and the report-
ing date. Consequently, and consistent with the theoretical predictions in Huddart et al. 
(2001), regulation that requires and enforces immediate publication of insider trades will in-
crease the informational efficiency of prices.    18
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Table 1. Sample selection 
Reason for exclusion  Nr. of observations ex-
cluded  Remaining Data 
Initial number of observations    4,272 
For 163 cases the entries for the transaction type (buy or sell) are 
missing and the missing information could not be retrieved from 
the company’s homepage or other sources.  
163 4109 
Intra-insider trades (one insider sold, another - e.g. the spouse - 
bought)  
15 4094 
If transactions on the same day are similar in the amount and the 
price traded we recognized the transactions as duplicate and de-
leted one of these transactions.  
42 4052 
We aggregate the transactions the same insider made on the same 
day and present those as one transaction with the net amount 
traded and the weighted average transaction price. 
1352 2700 
Transactions whose transaction dates or announcement dates 
were not covered by sufficient price data in order to conduct the 
event study with an event window of 41 days and an estimation 
window of 180 days. 
178 2522 
We only include trades for which the immediate reporting re-
quirement applies. We thus include i) all trades larger than € 
25,000 and ii) trades smaller than or equal to € 25,000 only if the 
aggregated volume of trades by the same insider in the preceding 
30 days surpasses € 25,000. All other trades are dropped from the 
sample.  
545 1977 
This table describes the composition of the final data set. The first column provides a record of all reasons that 
led us to exclude observations from the sample. The second column shows the number of excluded observations 
and the third column shows the number of remaining observations.  
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A. Transaction size 
   All  transactions  Purchases  Sales 
Number of observations    1,977  972  1,005 
mean 969,540.25  549,050.17  1,376,628.26 
Size, € 
median 69,243.00  41,913.50  131,407.50 
mean 1.02%  0.64%  1.39% 
Size, percent of shares outstanding 
median 0.06%  0.04%  0.09% 
Panel B. Transactions by position of insider 
 Purchases  Sales 
  #  mean size, €  median size, €  #  mean size, €  median size, € 
CEO 193  266,751.87  50,000.40  153  1,802,323.14  196,740.00 
Other members of executive 
board 
331 154,545.12  39,200.00  330 1,098,820.64  148,500.00 
Head of supervisory board  82  137,902.02  38.259.25  71  3,829,027.44  86,670.00 
Other members of supervisory 
board 
263 1,099,134.91  32,950.00  259  853,562.28  86,825.00 
Others 103  1,268,532.15  73,580.00  191  1,313,271.93  154,751.20 
Panel C. Serial trades 
 Purchases  Sales 
  single trades  trades in series  single trades  trades in se-
ries 
 602  370  618  387 
The table presents descriptive statistics. Panel A contains descriptive statistics on the trades in our sample while 
Panel B shows the number and average size of trades initiated by insiders holding different positions within the 
firm. Panel C shows the number of single trades (defined as a trade that is not followed by another trade by the 
same insider before it is reported) and the number of trades that are part of a series (where a series is defined as a 
string of trades by the same insider which are executed on different days and are reported after the last trade of 
the series is executed).  
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Table 3. Reporting Delays 
 All  transactions  Purchases  Sales 
  number percent number percent number percent 
0 days  194  9.81  74  7.61  120  11.94 
1  day  316 15.98 155 15.95 161 16.02 
2-7  days  954 48.25 455 46.81 499 49.65 
8-14  days  254 12.85 130 13.37 124 12.34 
15-30  days  137  6.93 79 8.13 58 5.77 
> 30 days  122  6.17  79  8.13  43  4.28 
total 1,977  972  1,005 
Mean, days  13.07  19.18  7.17 
t-statistic   5.97 
Median, days  4.00  5.00  4.00 
z-statistic   4.55 
 
The table shows the reporting delays (defined as the number of days between the trading date and the reporting 
date) for the insider trades in our sample. Columns 1 and 2 report figures for all transactions, columns 3 and 4 (5 
and 6) show figures for insider purchases (insider sales). Only trades which, according to the law, had to be 
reported are included.  
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Table 4. Determinants of Reporting Delays - Univariate Analysis 
 All  trans-
actions 
Purchases Sales 
 all  D≤30 all D≤30 all D≤30 
small trades (below mean)  14.05  5.51  19.97  5.88  7.50  5.11 
large  trades  (above  mean)  5.56 3.55 5.47 4.08 5.59 3.39 
t-statistic  2.67*  4.98* 1.66 2.13* 1.54 4.03* 
small firms (below median)  15.69  5.71  22.37  5.96  7.77  5.42 
large firms (above median)  10.45  4.86  15.26  5.55  6.68  4.32 
t-statistic  2.59*  3.34*  1.78 1.04 1.16  3.35* 
early trades (July 2002 - June 2003)   18.41  5.75  22.99  5.97  8.52  5.29 
late trades (July 2003 - June 2004)   7.72  4.82  10.45  5.33  6.55  4.60 
t-statistic  5.31*  3.69*  2.91* 1.51 1.95*  1.95* 
widely-held firms (n = 605 / 312 / 373)  22.81  5.34  40.33  5.29  8.16  5.37 
closely-held firms (n = 1,292 / 660 / 632)  7.91  5.25  9.19  5.98  6.58  4.49 
t-statistic  7.08* 0.33 7.52* 1.60  1.64 2.60* 
German reporting standards (n = 571 / 355 / 216)  22.58  6.05  31.14  6.78  8.53  4.94 
IAS or US-GAAP (n = 1,406 / 617 / 789)  9.21  4.98  12.31  5.24  6.79  4.78 
t-statistic 6.03*  3.79*  4.61*  3.76*  1.52  0.40 
Chair executive board (n = 346 / 193 / 153)  8.04  5.30  10.22  6.09  5.29  4.35 
Other member executive board (n = 661 / 331 / 330)  10.23  5.19  14.11  6.16  6.34  4.22 
Chair supervisory board (n = 153 / 82 / 71)  8.44  4.32  9.84  4.09  6.83  4.57 
Other member supervisory board (n = 523 / 263 / 260)  23.14  5.72  37.52  5.81  8.60  5.63 
Other traders (n = 294 / 103 / 191)  9.88  5.21  12.89  5.17  8.26  5.24 
ANOVA  F-statistic  9.17* 1.94 8.30* 2.35  1.74 3.39* 
We sort the sample into groups according to the variables listed in the first column. Only insider trades which, 
according to the law, had to be reported are included. For each partition of the sample we report average delays 
for all trades (columns 2 and 3) and separate values for purchases (columns 4 and 5) and sales (columns 6 and 
7). We repeat the analysis after exclusion of observations with a delay in excess of 30 days. An "*" indicates 
significance at the 5% level.  
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Table 5. Determinants of Reporting Delays - Regression Results 
 linear  linear, D>30 


























































































































R2 (adj.)  0.084 0.029 0.063 0.077 0.034 
The table reports the results of a regression of the reporting delays on the explanatory variables listed in column 
1. Column 2 reports the results of the baseline linear model. Alternative specifications exclude observations 
where the delay exceeds 30 days (column 3), winsorize the dependent variable at 30 (column 4), use the log of 
one plus the delay as the dependent variable (column 5) or use a dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if the 
delay is larger than 7 calendar days and zero otherwise as the dependent variable (column 6). Only transactions 
that, according to the law, had to be reported are included. t-values are given in parentheses and are based on 
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. Asterisks *, ** or ***denotes significance at the 10% (5%, 1%) 
level.   25
Table 6. Announcement Day CARs and Reporting Delays - Univariate Analysis 
 CAR0,20 t-statistic CAR0,20 D ≤ 7  CAR0,20 D > 8  t-statistic 
Pooled 2.518%  6.78
 *** 2.309% 3.113%  0.95 
Purchases   2.402%  4.96 
*** 1.900% 3.592%  1.60 
Sales -2.630%  -4.69
 *** -2.667% -2.500%  0.12 
The table reports cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) from a standard event study. The event date is the report-
ing date of an insider trade. The first line presents results from a pooled sample that includes both purchases and 
sales. CARs for sales have been multiplied by (-1). Lines 2 and 3 report separate results for purchases and sales, 
respectively. Column 1 reports results for all trades. Column 2 reports the t-statistic for a test of the mean against 
zero. Columns 3 and 4 report the CARs for trades that have been reported with a delay of 7 or less days and 8 or 
more days, respectively. The last column reports the t-statistic for a test of equality of the means. Asterisks *, ** 
or ***denotes significance at the 10% (5%, 1%) level.. 
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Table 7. Announcement Day CARs and Reporting Delays - Regression Results 
  Delay measured by  
  Delay  Delay; 
D>30 excl. 
Delay 






























































































































































































2 (adj.)  0.057 0.074 0.057 0.058 0.058 
The table reports the results of a regression of the reporting day CARs on the explanatory variables listed in 
column 1. The CARs are obtained from a standard event study. The event window is [0; 20]. The five models 
differ in the way the dependent variable "delay" is specified. Model 1 includes the raw data. Model 2 excludes 
observations where the delay exceeds 30 days. Model 3 uses a winsorized variable where values in excess of 30 
are set to 30. Model 4 uses the logarithm of 1 plus the delay. The last model includes a dummy variable that 
takes on the value one if the delay is larger than 7 days and zero otherwise. Only transactions that, according to 
the law, had to be reported are included. t-values are given in parentheses and are based on heteroscedasticity-
consistent standard errors. Asterisks *, ** or ***denotes significance at the 10% (5%, 1%) level.
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